It is exactly the fact that this alternate definition of atheism obfuscates many groups into one that is the problem. The excluded middle. Making it harder to communicate. People that do not have a position should not be lumped into either side of the proposition. And unburdening one side with a potential equivocation rescuing device. For example the comment I respond to was an "atheist" who condoned intolerance to the 'religious'. How could that come from a lack of belief? Followed by the claim that atheism is a lack of belief. See the problem?
I feel like you are conflating having a position with being able to prove something does or does not exist. Take this imagined dialog about the Loch Ness monster:
Believer: Do you believe the Loch Ness monster exists?
Skeptic: No, the sonar scans taken of the loch and our knowledge of the kinds of creatures that could have survived in it, indicate that the Loch Ness monster is extremely unlikely to have existed. So I am a non-believer.
Believer: But has every part of the loch been scanned simultaneously? And could there not be a gap in our scientific understanding?
Skeptic: No, but the majority of it has. And yes it is possible, if unlikely.
Believer: So you can't prove the Loch Ness monster doesn't exist?
Skeptic: I cannot.
Believer: Therefore you can't call yourself a "true" non-believer, since you merely lack belief in the Loch Ness monster but cannot prove that the preposition "the Loch Ness monster exists" is false. The law of the excluded middle tells us that a statement can only be true or false. Since you cannot prove the non truth of the proposition, you do not really have a position.
Skeptic: But I do have a position; I do not think belief in the Loch Ness monster is
reasonable, because the evidence does not support that belief.
Believer: So you admit you are a non-believer in the sense that a rock or baby is "non-believer".
Skeptic: I am not claiming
merely that I am non-believer, but that I am a non-believer because of the lack of evidence of the existence of the Loch Ness monster. A rock or baby doesn't have a position on these things.
Believer: Ah, but some people claim they are non-believers merely to deflect the burden of proof, while simultaneously making claims about not tolerating believers
Skeptic: The burden is still on these people to defend their claims about toleration. And the burden is still on me to defend my claims about whether it is reasonable to believe in the Loch Ness monster. The fact the "non-believer" classification can be used in faulty arguments does not mean is not useful. Any classification can be used in a faulty argument.
Anyway, the point of this overly long dialogue is that when people talk not believing in something, they are most of the time not attempting to make a rigorous philosophical proof to establish that this thing simply cannot exist as a matter of logic. They are rather making claims about what the evidence supports. The knowledge of the world we can acquire through logic alone is vanishingly small. So I find it perverse to suggest that the concept of (non) belief that exists in politics or science or human affairs generally shouldn't be extended to talk about religion. When the vast majority of people who are not analytic philosophers come to talk about their non-belief, shouldn't we have a way to classify that, and distinguish it from the elaborate claims made about the conceptual impossibility of God?
